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Policy in the 1980s and 1990s
| | | | Spirited debate in the 1970s preceded Greece's entry into the EC. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panhellinion Socialistiko Kinima--PASOK), which had gained a significant political following in opposition to Karamanlis's weakening New Democracy (Nea Demokratia--ND) party, strongly opposed Greek membership. Since Greece formally entered the EC in January 1981, however, membership in the EC and its successor organization, the EU, has become almost universally accepted by all political parties as the centerpiece of Greece's foreign policy and national security institutions. Especially after 1990, that association exerted influence on nearly every aspect of Greek life (see International Economic Policy in the 1990s , ch. 3).
Between 1981 and 1994, EC/EU membership provided Greece an important foreign policy tool in relations with Turkey (see Greece and the European Community , ch. 4). Because membership in the EU is an important goal of Turkish foreign policy, Greece has used its membership as a lever to try prevent Turkish membership (and largescale EU aid to Turkey) until Cyprus and other Aegean issues are resolved to Greece's satisfaction. While presiding over the EU in the first half of 1994, Greece also attempted to capitalize on its EU status in its dispute against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM--the internationally accepted name of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia after it declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991) in order to prevent the latter from assuming (or expropriating, in the Greek view) the historical name of ancient Greek Macedonia. (Other issues, such as FYROM's use of Alexander the Great's sunburst symbol on its new flag, became subordinate to the "name" issue as negotiations proceeded.)
At the same time, membership in a highly institutionalized structure has restrained Greek foreign policy. In issues concerning both Turkey and northern neighbors such as FYROM, Greece has found that its membership in the EC/EU has prevented it from following a nationalist or irredentist best. The stabilizing influence of the EC/EU prevented Greece from taking sides in the chronic hostilities that followed the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991, and instead promoted participation in a constructive (if self-interested and futile) search for Balkan solutions (see The Balkans , ch. 4).
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